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NO. 57 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Russia’s Arctic Strategy through 2035 
Grand Plans and Pragmatic Constraints 
Janis Kluge and Michael Paul 
Russia has adopted a development strategy for the Arctic for the period from October 
2020 to 2035. Reflecting hopes and perceived threats associated with the successive 
warming of the Arctic, it aims to advance development of the region’s abundant re-
sources, first and foremost oil and gas, and improve living conditions for the popu-
lation. In the longer term, the Kremlin hopes to establish the Northern Sea Route as 
a new global shipping artery. Moscow also worries that an increasingly ice-free Arctic 
could create new territorial vulnerabilities in its Far North, and is responding by re-
building its military presence there. Finally, Moscow also wants to preserve the region’s 
ecological balance. The indications are, however, that the interests of the energy sec-
tor and the military will be served, while funding to improve environmental protec-
tions and living conditions will remain inadequate. 
 
On 26 October Vladimir Putin formally 
adopted the new “Strategy for Developing 
the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring 
National Security through 2035”. It is based 
on the “Basic Principles” for Arctic policy 
adopted in March and succeeds the Arctic 
strategy 2020 dating from 2013. 
The political significance of the Arctic in 
Russia has grown steadily since the end of 
the 2000s, as reflected in various strategies, 
programmes and presidential speeches, as 
well as the reactivation and modernisation 
of military bases in the region. The Arctic 
region will also occupy the limelight in May 
2021, when Russia is due to assume the chair 
of the Arctic Council for two years. 
While the new strategy is largely built 
around continuity, shifts in Russian domes-
tic and foreign policy since 2013 are also 
visible between the lines: The strategy does 
discuss the possibilities for international 
cooperation, but more space is devoted to 
threat scenarios. And where the 2013 Strat-
egy named civil society organisations as 
implementation partners, they are now 
absent. Additionally, the assessment of cli-
mate change has also changed. 
Arctic Problems 
Improving living conditions in the Arctic 
is a prominent priority of the new Strategy. 
By 2030 it aims to end the population 
decline that has affected the entire Arctic 
region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Every year the Russian Arctic suffers a net 
outflow of about 18,000 of its approximately 
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2.4 million residents. It is no longer finan-
cially attractive to settle in this cold region 
with its long, dark winters. Although the 
average income exceeds the Russian mean, 
the cost of living is also considerably higher. 
Apart from the hostile climate, the biggest 
problem for the region’s population and 
economy is the lack of infrastructure and 
its poor condition where it does exist. Cli-
mate-related thawing of the permafrost is 
already having devastating effects, and is 
expected to affect 70 percent of the infra-
structure in the coming years. At the same 
time, many regionally proposed road-, rail- 
and port-building projects remain unreal-
ised due to lack of state funding. From 
Moscow’s perspective, the Arctic is just one 
of many problematic and structurally weak 
regions across the Federation. A state pro-
gramme for socio-economic development 
in the Arctic was launched in 2014, but 
the federal budget provides it with just 17.6 
billion roubles (€190 million) for 2021–23. 
By comparison, the programme earmarks 
more than 300 billion roubles (€3.2 billion) 
for Crimea. 
The absence of adequate state funding for 
the lofty goals of past Arctic strategies leaves 
Russia’s powerful energy sector driving 
developments in the Far North today. The 
Arctic accounts for more than 90 percent 
of Russian’s natural gas production and 17 
percent of its oil. Major new projects like 
Novatek’s LNG terminals on the Yamal and 
Gydan Peninsulas form the driving force 
behind local infrastructure expansion. This 
applies not only to private investment in 
road and rail construction in the western 
part of the Russian Arctic, on the basis of 
state concessions or public-private partner-
ships, but also to the ports of the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) and their connection to Rus-
sian’s industrial regions. President Putin’s 
National Goals of 2018 set a target of quad-
rupling the annual cargo volume on the 
NSR to 80 million tonnes. There is currently 
disagreement in Moscow over that target, 
which is now considered unrealistic. The 
Russian state is to shoulder one-third of the 
investment required for the NSR, which 
Rosatom estimates at US$11.7 billion; the 
rest is to be contributed by Rosatom, Ros-
neft, Novatek, Gazprom Neft, Gazprom, 
Nornickel, banks and future users of the 
route. 
Moscow hopes that commercial projects 
to develop offshore oil and gas will also 
spur development. Western sanctions have 
to date largely blocked such initiatives. 
China is courted as a substitute, but its 
ability to supply the technology (including 
for seismic exploration in the Barents Sea) 
and the necessary capital is limited. It is 
also questionable whether future oil prices 
will justify the development of these re-
mote reserves. A price of at least US$80 per 
barrel is required to make the Arctic off-
shore fields profitable; the current price 
is about US$48. Progress on the planned 
development of new coalfields is also slow. 
The window for extracting these remote 
fossil resources is likely to successively 
close, as international climate protection 
efforts cause demand to decline. 
New Threat Scenarios 
Historically, extreme climate conditions 
have acted as a natural barrier protecting 
Russia’s long Arctic coast. The melting of 
the “eternal ice” is therefore cause for con-
cern. The new strategy speaks of growing 
conflict potential in the Arctic, requiring a 
permanent expansion of Russia’s military 
presence there. 
In a sense Russia is acquiring new exter-
nal borders that need to be protected from 
potential aggressors. A naval threat could 
theoretically come from the east, through 
the Bering Strait, or from the west via bases 
in Greenland and Norway. The shrinking of 
the ice therefore creates new vulnerabilities 
to attack. From the Russian perspective, its 
oil and gas terminals are also prime targets 
requiring defence. In response, many of the 
Soviet-era bases that had been closed since 
1990 have been reactivated and new ones 
constructed – including ten search and res-
cue bases, sixteen deepwater ports, ten new 
air bases (out of fourteen in all) and ten air 
defence installations. 
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The military frequently steps in where 
civilian capabilities in the region are lack-
ing or prohibitively expensive; search and 
rescue would be one example. So a growing 
military presence need not necessarily in-
dicate expansionism. Nevertheless, a signifi-
cant increase in military activities is ob-
served, including a mock aerial assault on 
radar installations at Vardø, Norway, GPS 
signal-jamming in Finland, and intensified 
submarine patrols. In October 2019 ten sub-
marines passed through the Norwegian Sea 
en route to the North Atlantic, in the biggest 
such manoeuvre since the Cold War. And 
in August 2020 a Russian warplane pursued 
a US bomber into Danish airspace during 
NATO’s Allied Sky exercise. 
Following its naval doctrine, Russia seeks 
to bolster its position as a maritime power, 
in particular in the Arctic and Atlantic. The 
role of the NSR is to guarantee access to the 
Atlantic and Pacific. The Northern Fleet on 
the Kola Peninsula therefore enjoys abso-
lute priority; in the event of conflict it is 
also expected to defend the ballistic missile 
submarines that represent two-thirds of 
Russia’s naval nuclear deterrent. The re-
activated Soviet-era bastion concept fore-
sees a sanctuary extending from the Barents 
Sea to Iceland. In the event of conflict the 
Russian fleet would secure access to the 
Atlantic while denying hostile forces access 
to the Russian Arctic. Air patrols along the 
NSR to protect the bastion and its fleet 
resumed back in 2007. In 2019 new air de-
fence missiles were stationed near Novaya 
Zemlya in the Barents Sea and a hypersonic 
missile was tested – also as a demonstra-
tion of Russian strength. In addition, mobile 
S-350 surface-to-air missile launchers 
embedded in an anti-access area denial 
(A2/AD) strategy protect the bases on Franz 
Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya, the New 
Siberian Islands, Novaya Zemlya and Wran-
gel Island. The range of the system as a 
whole covers all islands and archipelagos 
along the NSR. 
Russia exhibits a defensive stance in the 
Arctic, but is prepared for rapid escalation 
in the event of conflict. That could include 
offensive operations to defend the bastion, 
including the occupation of parts of north-
ern Scandinavia. 
As well as perceiving new challenges at 
its external borders, Moscow also sees new 
domestic and foreign threats to its internal 
security. The effects are felt negatively by 
members of Russian civil society working 
on environmental issues in the Arctic and 
defending the rights of indigenous popu-
lations. Major economic development 
projects regularly provoke protests by local 
populations. Some civil society organisa-
tions have been coopted by the Russian 
state, others are subject to repressive meas-
ures. Those that receive funding from 
abroad are labelled “foreign agents” and 
subjected to strict surveillance and restric-
tions. 
Half-hearted Environmentalism 
The Kremlin’s new Arctic Strategy reiterates 
its intention to protect the Arctic environ-
ment. Action is certainly urgently needed. 
Crumbling heavy industries, climate change 
effects like thawing permafrost, and local 
administrative failure create a toxic mix 
for the Arctic’s fragile ecosystems. This was 
spotlighted in early June 2020, when more 
than 20,000 tonnes of diesel leaked into the 
Ambarnaya River after thawing permafrost 
subsided under a large storage tank. In 
2019 – and again in 2020 – forest fires 
blazed out of control across the Russian 
Arctic. 
The Arctic Strategy now proposes up-
grading sensitive infrastructure to cope 
with climate change. It is also planned to 
designate new nature reserves and to direct 
state support to the refuse disposal sector. 
In a new development, pollution in Russian 
Arctic will be monitored regularly, includ-
ing contamination for which North America, 
Europe and Asia could be made responsible. 
While many states are stepping up their 
global climate protection efforts, the Krem-
lin increasingly avoids connecting global 
warming to carbon emissions. The 2013 Arc-
tic Strategy still contained a reference to 
anthropogenic climate change. The new 
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document makes no mention of the causes 
of global warming. 
Moscow’s climate policy thus remains 
ambivalent. It wields the issue in the United 
Nations arena to set itself apart from Trump’s 
Washington and to appear as a responsible 
actor. Although legislation to regulate CO2 
emissions is under discussion, Russia’s 
emissions targets under the Paris Agree-
ment are in fact higher than the current 
levels. Phasing out oil and gas production is 
not contemplated. Quite the contrary: Mos-
cow intends to further expand production 
and exports. The same also applies to coal, 
which is especially harmful to the climate; 
here annual production could increase to 
up to 668 million tonnes by 2035. 
Cooperation in the Arctic 
The door to international cooperation has 
not been slammed completely shut, even 
if the space devoted to threat perceptions 
has grown in the new Arctic Strategy. The 
sometimes contradictory interests – such 
as defending national sovereignty versus 
internationalisation of the sea route – are 
reflected in an ambivalent stance that con-
tains both confrontational and cooperation-
seeking elements, emphasising political com-
petition or practical cooperation depending 
on the situation. 
The new Arctic Strategy contains a sepa-
rate section on international cooperation, 
where foreign investment plays a central 
role. Here, Moscow is principally interested 
in technologies for and investment in the 
energy sector – which fall under Western 
sanctions. Western firms could cooperate 
in infrastructure projects and in tackling 
environmental problems. 
German-Russian cooperation in the 
natural sciences is less problematic for the 
Kremlin and remains successful. The new 
Arctic Strategy proposes developing a com-
prehensive plan for joint international 
research on ecosystems and the effects of 
climate change. One example of successful 
German-Russian cooperation is the inter-
national Multidisciplinary drifting Observa-
tory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC), 
which would not have been possible with-
out Russia’s experience and support. 
Dr. Janis Kluge is Senior Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division.  
Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow in the International Security Division. 
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